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Cognitive neuroscience aims at specifications of human cog-
nition as instantiated in the human brain. This requires that
information from multiple levels be taken into consideration and
that information at one level be used to guide the investigations at
another level. With regard to the human language faculty, linguis-
tics specifies structural descriptions of the relevant knowledge
types such as phonological, syntactic, and semantic structures.
Psycholinguistics specifies the processing architectures of differ-
ent language functions such as speaking, reading, and listening.
These processing architectures explain how, in real time, the dif-
ferent sources of linguistic knowledge in long-term memory are
recruited and exploited in mapping sound or orthography onto
meaning (in listening and reading) or vice versa (in speaking and
writing). Finally, (cognitive) neuroscience specifies how the pro-
cessing architectures are instantiated in the human brain. In this
context, an account of the neural architecture of language should
specify which brain areas are recruited for different language
functions, as well as how these areas communicate while these
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functions are executed. Classically, neuropsychological data from
patients with a lesion in the language-relevant cortex have been
used in studies on the neural architecture of language. The ad-
vent of a whole generation of advanced neuroimaging techniques
(positron-emission tomography [PET], functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging [fMRI], magnetic-encephalography [MEG]) in the
recent decades, however, replaced lesion studies as the major tool
for investigating neural architecture issues.
As everyone involved in cognitive neuroscience of language
realizes, it is far from trivial to relate to each other the levels of
linguistic description, processing architecture, and neural hard-
ware. This is partly due to the differences in the conceptual vo-
cabulary in which accounts at the distinct levels are couched.
However, we also suffer from the fact that we do not have a full
grasp of the mapping relations between the different levels. For
instance, is the mapping between specific components of the cog-
nitive architecture and a set of anatomically defined brain ar-
eas one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-one (Mehler, Morton, &
Jusczyk, 1984)? It would be even worse if there does not exist
a transparent or lawful relation between cognitive architecture
and neural architecture, as some have claimed (Fodor, 1975). In
the latter case, the attempt to connect brain and behavior is a
useless endeavor. I take the success of cognitive neuroscience in
many domains of cognition as an indication that even in the ab-
sence of full knowledge about the exact nature of the mapping
relation between cognitive and neural architectures, this relation
is less opaque and more direct than proponents of the functional
stance have claimed. Such is the general assumption underlying
cognitive neuroscience research. Within this broad framework of
cognitive neuroscience, one has to look in more detail what the
constraints and contributions of different subdomains are in de-
signing a full account of the neurocognition of language. In the
remainder, I will focus on the constraints from neuroanatomy, a
field that is discussed in this volume by Uylings.
A prime example of the contribution of neuroanatomy is the
famous map by Brodmann (1869–1918). This map consists of 47
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different areas, usually referred to by expressions such as BA
44 for Brodmann Area 44. The numbers of the Brodmann Areas
were determined by the order in which Brodmann went through
the brain, analyzing one area after the other. Brodmann’s clas-
sification is based on the cytoarchitectonics of the brain, which
refers to the structure, form, and position of the cells in the six
layers of the cortex. Quantification was done by Brodmann on
postmortem brains. These were sectioned into slices of 5–10 m
thickness that underwent Nissl staining and were then inspected
under the microscope. In this way, the distribution of different cell
types across cortical layers and brain areas could be determined.
Even today, Brodmann’s map, which was published in 1909, is
seen as a hallmark in the history of neuroscience. It was pub-
lished in Leipzig by the publisher Barth after almost 10 years
of hard work under the title Vergleichende Lokalisationslehre der
Grosshirnrinde in ihren Prinzipien dargestellt auf Grund des Zel-
lenbaues. Brodmann’s work reveals that the composition of the six
cortical layers, in terms of cell types, varies across the brain. Also,
cell numbers can vary. The primary visual cortex, for instance, has
about twice as many neurons per cortical column as other brain
areas (Amaral, 2000).
The classical view among neuroanatomists is that these
architectural differences in brain structure are indicative of
functional differences and, conversely, that functional differ-
ences demand differences in architecture (Bartels & Zeki, 2005;
Brodmann, 1905; Vogt & Vogt, 1919; Von Economo & Koskinas,
1925). Following the classical view, through different ways of char-
acterizing brain structure (i.e., cyto-, myelo-, and receptorarchi-
tectonics; Zilles & Palomero-Gallagher, 2001), brain areas can
be identified, for which differences in structural characteristics
imply functional differences. From this view, it follows that one
should look for the structural features that determine why a par-
ticular brain area can support, for instance, the processing of a
first or second language.
In contrast to the classical view in neuroanatomy, more re-
cent accounts have argued that from a computational perspective,
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different brain areas are very similar. For instance, Douglas and
Martin (2004) argued that
The same basic laminar and tangential organization of the
excitatory neurons of the neocortex, the spiny neurons, is
evident wherever it has been sought. The inhibitory neu-
rons similarly show a characteristic morphology and pat-
terns of connections throughout the cortex (. . .) all things
considered, many crucial aspects of morphology, laminar
distribution, and synaptic targets are very well conserved
between areas and between species. (p. 439)
Functional differences between brain areas are in this perspective
mainly due to variability of the input signals in forming functional
specializations. Domain specificity of a particular piece of cortex
might thus not so much be determined by heterogeneity of brain
tissue, but by the way in which its functional characteristics are
shaped by the input.
Recent neuroimaging studies provide support for this view.
A number of remarkable forms of neural plasticity have been re-
ported in recent years. I will here discuss one example. In a recent
study by Amedi, Raz, Pianka, Malach, and Zohary (2003), the au-
thors report that they found increased activation in the primary
visual cortex (V1) during a verbal memory task in congenitally
blind subjects. Moreover, the stronger the activation in V1, the
better the memory performance. If the structural properties of
V1 had been decisive for its functional capacities, then it would
be hard to see how the same neurons that in seeing people sup-
port vision could be recruited in the blind for verbal memory. This
demonstrates that the cytoarchitectonic constraints for specifica-
tions of cognitive function are rather loose. Presumably, the input
and the patterns of connectivity between areas are a more rele-
vant functional parameter than the differences in the composition
of cortical layers.
With respect to the language function, comparative neu-
roanatomy further supports my point. In a recent study (Petrides,
Cadoret, & Mackey, 2005), an area in the macaque monkey has
been described that is cytoarchitectonically comparable to BA 44
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in humans, which is part of Broca’s area. BA 44 in humans has
been found to be involved in syntactic processes, among other
things. The homologous area in the macaque monkey subserves
orofacial movements. One could make an argument that in the
course of evolution, human language has developed out of a sys-
tem of vocalizations that require the involvement of orofacial
musculature. However, my point here is that whatever the evo-
lutionary trajectory to language, an area in the macaque mon-
key with a very similar cytoarchitectonic structure as Broca’s
area has a clearly different function than in humans. This again
supports the claim that the purely cytoarchitectonic constraints
for specifications of cognitive functions do not seem to be very
strong.
All of this does not imply that I deny the great importance of
cytoarchitectonic structures for human cognition. Clearly, with-
out these basic building blocks of the brain, cognition would
not be possible. Without neurons, glia, and axons, the cogni-
tive machinery would not work. However, the issue here is that
these building blocks enter into processes of functional special-
ization. My claim is that the exact nature of these functional
specializations is more easily inferred from an analysis of in-
put and connectivity than by looking at the cytoarchitectonic
characteristics.
What are the consequences for accounts of language learn-
ing and language processing? I suggest that important evidence
can come from different patterns of brain activation for differ-
ent aspects of language processing (e.g., syntax vs. semantics).
At the same time, I do not think that at the moment there is
much evidence for the claim that much hinges on whether a par-
ticular activation is found in, say, BA 44 rather than BA 45. An
approach based on reversed inferences from structural anatomy
to cognitive function does not seem well constrained enough in
the light of our current knowledge. It is functional anatomy
that counts, and that might provide stronger constraints than
structural anatomy for specifications of the different forms of
human cognition. This implies that we should look at patterns
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of associations and dissociations in measures of brain activity.
These might provide more direct insights into the neural in-
stantiations of cognitive functions than the classical anatomical
measures.
In summary, a cognitive neuroscience approach of language
takes information and constraints from different levels of analy-
sis into consideration, in the service of a full account of the neu-
rocognition of language. The assumption hereby is that different
levels can be connected in a transparent way. At the same time,
not all constraints have the same force. Here it is argued that the
constraints provided by the classical anatomical measures (cy-
toarchitectonics and myeloarchitectonics) in our current under-
standing are only very loose constraints for detailed specifications
of cognitive functions, including language learning and language
processing. However, measures of the computational features of
brain tissue might provide stronger constraints. For the time
being, our best bet for understanding cognitive specialization
is to focus on measures of functional rather than structural
neuroanatomy.
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